Communication Dans Un Congrès Année : 2024

Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations

Michal Feldman
Vishnu V Narayan
Tomasz Ponitka

Résumé

We study best-of-both-worlds guarantees for the fair division of indivisible items among agents with subadditive valuations. Our main result establishes the existence of a random allocation that is simultaneously ex-ante 1 2 -envy-free, ex-post 1 2 -EFX and ex-post EF1, for every instance with subadditive valuations. We achieve this result by a novel polynomial-time algorithm that randomizes the well-established envy cycles procedure in a way that provides ex-ante fairness. Notably, this is the first best-of-both-worlds fairness guarantee for subadditive valuations, even when considering only EF1 without EFX.
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hal-04923223 , version 1 (31-01-2025)

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Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka. Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations. EC 2024 - 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Jul 2024, New Haven, United States. pp.1236 - 1266, ⟨10.1145/3670865.3673592⟩. ⟨hal-04923223⟩
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